Principal-agent analyses of delegation to international organizations have advanced our understanding of international cooperation through institutions. Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Our researchers mainly follow the principles and rules laid down by the above important policy and rules. He is a specialist on international monetary and financial policies. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya, 2nd Edition Charles M. But I was positively surprised how good this book was. Delegation under anarchy: states, international organizations, and principal-agent theory Darren G. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations.
The global movement for economic justice relies considerably on policy analysis and research conducted by hundreds if not thousands of academics researchers and scholars. It is essential reading for scholars and students who want to really understand international organizations. This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics. Section three will then offer a series of propositions that attempt to promote discussion over the effects of dual delegation and sketch out a preliminary research agenda. Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. Screening power: international organizations as informative agents Alexander Thompson; 9.
Lawrence Broz and Michael Brewster Hawes; 4. There has been considerable attention paid in political science literature initially in American and comparative and increasingly in International Relations sub-fields to this empirical trend Huber and Shipan 2003; Pollack 2003. Cite this article as: Bauer, S. Chang, Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union Peter F. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? A problem of principals: common agency and social lending at the multilateral development banks Mona Lyne, Daniel L.
As national economies integrate at the same time that technological complexity progresses, decision-makers confront at home and abroad the difficulty of devising specific policy responses to the challenges of international interdependence. It will proceed in four parts. Her research focuses on international organizations and financial institutions. Delegation and Agency in International Organizations Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86209-7 - Delegation and Agency in International Organizations - Edited by Darren G. Bibliography Includes bibliographical references p. Delegation to international courts and the limits of recontracting political power Karen J. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7.
Louis Other books in the series Alberto Alesina And Howard Rosenthal, Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy Lee J. Rev Int Org 2007 2: 305. They need to read the signs of time and to make their voices heard by responding to peoples cries for justice and dignity, and by speaking truth to the powers- whoever and wherever their may be. The project was concerned with the questions whether international bureaucracies can be regarded as independent actors and to what extent, under what conditions and in what areas they exert influen ce on debates, decisions and policymaking in national and international environmental governance. Andrews, When Majorities Fail: The Russian Parliament, 1990—1993 Jeffrey S. Louis Thrainn Eggertsson, Max Planck Institute, Germany, and University of Iceland Founding editors James E.
Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. However, broader tests of why and when states delegate are not possible without a clear means for objectively identifying and measuring delegation. Delegation and discretion in the European Union Mark A. Hawkins is Associate Professor in the Political Science Department at Brigham Young University. It concludes that only Delors was able to act as a transforming leader, whereas Santer and Prodi mainly performed as transactional leaders. In sum, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations represents a substantial and stimulating organization.
This will be followed by a summary of the two dominant strands of literature concerned with bureaucratic control. Lake is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Variation in Agent Preferences, Legitimacy, Tasks, and Permeability: 7. Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? This book was just too dry and too theoretical for me. This book was just too dry and too theoretical for me. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at the international level than at the domestic level.
It is all the more welcome, as its editors, Darren G. Directions for Future Research: 12. Dutiful agents, rogue actors, or both? This article analyzes the leadership of three Commission Presidents: Jacques Delors, Jacques Santer and Romano Prodi. Cortell and Susan Peterson; 10. This distinction frames the book, which is divided into two main sections.